Abstract: In this article I briefly describe the main questions related to the design of a tax system and introduce policy evaluation methods that can help us to learn about the effects of different taxes on different outcomes. Then I consider what various responses mean in terms of agents' behavior and give my view of aspects that are important when tax systems are reformed. Finally I present the results of my PhD dissertation (Harju (2013) ) and the contributions of the articles therein one by one, the aim being to offer examples of empirical tax research applying policy evaluation methods.
Introduction
In the last couple of decades there has been a new wave of empirical research in economics, often called a credibility revolution (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) . Experimental research designs, which can offer causal relationships, have to a large extent replaced previous methods that were mainly based on correlations. This is also the case in public economics literature. Experimental methods, especially the use of tax policy changes as a source of variation, have introduced new possibilities for doing more credible tax research. This is a clear phenomenon and perhaps the most visible proof of this development is that a growing number of PhD students are applying these methods in their dissertations.
These modern methods have been applied widely. The main input for development in methods and applications have been made by labor economists. Also, in public economics the traditional theories concentrating e.g. on the effects of income taxes on the behavior of individuals and the effect of dividend taxes on investment responses of firms, have been tested with these methods (Feldstein (1995 (Feldstein ( , 1999 ; Gruber and Saez (2002) ; Yagan (2013) ). However, the research questions have also become more innovative. In public economics research, areas that have previously been understudied have attracted interest. To mention a couple of examples: many new studies have estimated the effect of tax incentives on the payout policies of firms in a detailed manner (see e.g. Harju (2013) ). The decisions of owners of small businesses have also attracted attention (Edmark and Gordon (2013) ). In addition, empirical literature studying the scope of tax evasion has emerged applying these new sophisticated methods (Kleven et al. (2011) ; Slemrod et al. (2001) ).
Furthermore, current theoretical research often largely offers a hypothetical basis for empirical research (Saez (2001) ; Chetty (2009a) ). This has also improved the interpretation of empirical results, which is, of course, highly important. What is also important is to be able to define those decision margins that are the most fundamental for economic agents. For example, the effects of dividend taxes on the investment decisions of firms are more fundamental than e.g. on the tax planning behavior of firms. Also, the estimated tax elasticities on different margins have different effects on welfare and efficiency, not only depending on how large the elasticity is but also on what margin the effects are estimated.
The development in methods has been global, and thus also in Nordic countries the quality of empirical research in public economics has improved remarkably. One example of this is my PhD dissertation (Harju (2013) ), which applies Finnish tax reforms as an exogenous variation and then studies the effects of those on different outcomes. These Finnish tax reforms were hotly debated when they were introduced and afterwards. Thus the results are highly policy-relevant, which is typical for all these policy evaluation studies. There are also many other good examples of this kind of analysis from the Nordic countries (see e.g. Selin (2008) and Kosonen (2011) ).
The paper proceeds as follows. I first present the trade-off between efficiency and equity aspects in designing a tax system, although after this short introduction this paper concentrates solely on the efficiency side. The main aim is to offer a view of the developments in empirical research but also to introduce ideas as to how the results should be interpreted and what we can learn from studies that apply these new methods. One additional motivation for this piece is that policyrelevant and credibly compiled results should be used more in policy discussions and decision-making process.
Designing a Tax System
The question of how to collect tax revenue to fund public spending is at the core of public economics and leads to considerations of how to design a tax system. The design of a tax system essentially raises issues concerning the efficiency and equity of the system.
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As regards efficiency, traditional economics textbooks will teach that the market offers efficient outcomes (Myles (1995) ). However, there are many different markets operating in the real world. Thus it is hard to find an efficient outcome for each and every market. In some cases markets may even generate market failures. In such cases, government intervention may actually increase efficiency. However, the standard approach to examining the efficiency of taxes is to offer insights into how taxes could cause as little inefficiency as possible.
Taxes alter relative prices in a market and create a wedge between the price paid by the buyer and the price received by the seller. This leads to considerations of how and to what extent economic agents respond to these price changes and how large the costs of these price changes are for agents.
3 Thus, in general, to be able to design a tax system we should have information on how taxes affect the behavior of individuals and firms. This creates a need for empirical estimates of the effects of taxes from the point of view of efficiency.
Nevertheless, equity reasons are also important. Although private markets may offer efficient outcomes, they may not always be distributionally optimal or socially desirable. A government may want to adjust the distribution of income through taxes and subsidies, although this could cause inefficiencies in the economy. This leads economists to study the equity aspects of tax reforms.
2. Administrative costs and the transparency of a tax system, for instance, are also important when designing a tax system. 3. A recent and very comprehensive book on tax design is the Mirrlees review (2010 and 2011) .
The design of a tax system is complicated as there is commonly a trade-off between the two perspectives of equity and efficiency: the objective of creating a more equal tax system causes more inefficiency, and vice versa. Consider, for example, if the objective is to obtain a more equal income distribution through income taxation or subsidies to the poor. Such an objective requires an increase in the progressivity 4 of the tax code. This creates detrimental incentives in the economy which could then lead to an increase in inefficiency due to changes in the behavior of economic agents.
The focus in this article is solely to investigate the efficiency, and not the equity, aspects of various taxes.
Seeking Credible Evidence
There is a clear tension in the field of empirical research in economics between so-called 'structural' and 'reduced-form' approaches (see Chetty (2009a) ). The structural approach tries to model the entire economy from the point of view of economic behavior and then estimate the effects of policy on behavior and welfare. The reduced-form approach instead tries to estimate the effects of a certain exogenous shock on behavior. Proponents of the structural approach claim that there is only little we can learn from the results of reduced-form studies in terms of welfare analysis. Proponents of the reduced-form approach, on the other hand, say that the identification in structural studies is often too suspicious, for example because of the strong assumptions, omitted or unobservable variables and selection problems.
There is also a middle ground between these two approaches called the 'sufficient statistic' view (Chetty (2009a) ). This view derives welfare formulas in which estimates from program evaluation can be used. This article builds on the reduced-form way of thinking but the aim is also to discuss the welfare consequences of the results. Therefore, one can see this piece as an attempt to offer an approach to how reduced-form estimates can be used in a welfare analysis following Chetty's inspiration.
In recent years, an increasing number of empirical economics studies in various subfields have concentrated on estimating the effects caused by government interventions on economic outcomes using micro data. Angrist and Pischke (2010) present a description of developments in empirical research in economics. Over the last couple of decades the micro-based empirical methods have been vastly expanded. Experimental research designs have mostly replaced previous methods mainly based on correlations. Although the aim in economics has always been to estimate causal effects, nowadays identification is usually taken more seriously than before. Economists are keen to use methods concentrating on how we can identify the effects of certain changes, e.g. in government policy. In a way this is also what separates empirical economics from other social sciences, as identification is much more the focus in economics than in other social sciences. Much of this development in the field of empirical research in economics is due to the increase in academic interest in policy-relevant questions, especially in the field of public economics. This has led to a concentration on the design of empirical work among economists.
The most promising way for economists to be able to solve the effect of one variable on another is to organize random trials. In this case, a randomly chosen group faces a treatment, while another group does not (i.e. the latter is used as a control group). It is then possible to compare the outcomes of these two groups. In such randomized trials, the 'internal validity' of the results is commonly good, meaning that the empirical design determines cause-and-effect relationships. However, there are also some problems in randomized trials. One, and perhaps the greatest, of the challenges in randomized trials is the 'external validity' of the results: how well the results are applicable to other groups. Some studies of this type use small and very specific populations of people which give clear effects for those individuals, but the results may not necessarily offer insights for wider interpretation. Thus one can see a trade-off between internal and external validity. Critics have claimed that the focus is too much on details, and not enough on generally important topics. Whilst the focus in many papers is indeed very narrow, a small and narrowly defined population could nevertheless offer new insights which could then be extended, with certain assumptions, to broader populations.
Empirical public economics literature has also progressed in recent years. However, clean-cut random trials are rare in public economics literature. This is natural as, for example, it is hard to get policy makers to randomize tax rates for people.
5 Thus a much more common research design in the field of empirical public economics is natural ex-5. However, this does not mean that there is no room for random trials in public economics. In the US, the government randomized negative tax rates for individuals already in the late 1960s (Moffitt (2004) ). Also, many subfields in public economics have gained their strongest evidence based on randomized experiments, e.g. tax evasion literature (Slemrod et al. (2001) , Kleven et al. (2011) ).
perimental methods, utilizing government interventions as an exogenous variation. These methods are closely related to randomized experimental designs. However, in natural experimental designs the conditions of the exogenous experiment are determined naturally, whereas in randomized experiments the experimentalist determines the conditions. In natural experimental designs the external validity is usually good, but often it can be hard to demonstrate the internal validity convincingly. The empirical examples I present at the end of this article apply natural experimental methods. The methods that economists use in natural experimental studies are commonly instrumental variables, regression discontinuity methods and difference-in-differences. 6 The latter, differences-in-differences, has become a very popular method and is often used with panel data. The intuition of the method is to have two groups of firms or individuals, one facing a specific treatment (treatment group) and one being left untreated (control group). The outcomes of these groups are compared over time, before and after the treatment. The main identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the treatment, the average outcomes of the treatment and control groups would have developed along parallel trends over time. Also, the composition of the agents in the two groups should remain the same over time. If convincingly demonstrated, the difference-in-differences method shows the causal effect of a treatment.
However, the differences-in-differences method has its limitations. The differences-in-differences method is appropriate only when the interventions are random. Therefore, the endogeneity of interventions is always an issue when the method is applied, especially in the case of natural experimental studies. Also, the linearity assumptions and the appropriateness of comparison groups used in non-experimental studies are often noted as problems. Nevertheless, the differences-indifferences method offers a way to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems arising in standard empirical studies comparing heterogeneous individuals. It is also very simple to apply and makes it possible to estimate causal relationships if it is used appropriately.
In addition to developments in microeconometric methods, the amount and quality of data available have also increased a lot in recent years. In particular, register-based micro-level data sets have become available to researchers. This offers exact precision, which, with new innovative ways of examining the responses to agents' behavior, increases the overall quality of the empirical research. Especially among Nordic countries the availability of credible register-based and 6. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) offer an extensive review of recent developments in empirical econometrics.
easily accessible total data sets have made possible for researchers to have competitive advantage in the field of applied empirical research.
Behavioral Responses -What Matters?
Generally the costs of taxes are greater than the increase in revenue from the taxes. The difference between these is often called the deadweight loss or the excess burden of the tax, which measures the efficiency of the tax. The deadweight loss of a tax is commonly analyzed in the literature by comparing distortionary tax to nondistortionary lump-sum tax, which does not by definition offer any incentives for behavioral changes. The magnitude of the deadweight loss depends on the extent to which agents change their behavior due to the tax. Subsequently, for efficiency analysis, it is very important to know the elasticity of the response to the tax change.
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In general, there are two channels of responses: the substitution effect and the income effect. The substitution effect means that, in the case of income taxes for example, the income earned per working hour is smaller, and thus makes it less attractive for consumers to work as much as without taxes. On the other hand, the income effect goes in the opposite direction, the loss in income from taxes encouraging consumers to work more to guarantee a certain income level. The income effect is also present with lump-sum taxes, but the substitution effect is not. Empirical studies have found the substitution effect to be the dominant channel of the two.
Already two decades ago Slemrod (1992) offered an interesting view of how we should construct our thinking on the effects of taxes. He analyzes the evidence from the 1980s tax reforms in the US and constructs a view of what we can learn from these responses.
Taxes may have complex effects. According to Slemrod, the relative price changes due to tax changes can affect various outcomes. In addition to real responses, there are also other relevant margins of response which should be separated. Examples of these are misreporting of income, the structure of financial claims, the legal form of organizations, transactions over time, etc. Based on these, Slemrod creates a hierarchy structure of behavioral responses to taxation.
The first tier is the timing of transactions. This concerns the question of whether there are opportunities over time to realize tax savings 7. Mankiw et al. (2010) and Diamond and Saez (2011) offer good reviews and discussions of optimal taxation. However, these two reviews suggest more or less different recommendations for policy. Also, Mankiw (2010) raises some critical notes on the standard literature of assessing the tax burden.
that outweigh the costs. This could be seen as a reaction to a change in tax law with only a temporary change in behavior.
The second tier is financial and accounting responses. Evidence that supports the rearrangement of economic claims falls under this category. This could be possible e.g. where there are two tax bases, only one of which is changed.
The third tier is the real economic decisions of economic agents. These are, for instance, decisions regarding hours of work by individuals, investment decisions by firms etc. This is also the most fundamental channel of response.
However, it is also essential to consider the costs caused by taxes together with the channel of response. Costs resulting from time transactions or the restructuring of financial claims are different e.g. to those related to real economic decisions regarding hours of work. If, for example, the elasticity with respect to the income tax on work participation or hours of work is large, the deadweight loss could also be large. But if the response to taxes is only in transactions over time or the restructuring of financial claims, the deadweight loss can be very different and much lower even if the response in these margins is large. Therefore it is not only relevant to know the different margins of response, as Slemrod noted, but it is also important to know the extent of the costs caused by taxes in order to be able to analyze the welfare effects of the taxation (Chetty (2009a and 2009b) ). This could lead to very different conclusions about the efficiency of the tax system.
Example Studies
The following example studies are part of my PhD dissertation (Harju (2013) ), in which I apply the policy evaluation methods described above. The brief conclusions below attempt first to describe the research questions shortly and sum up the main results of each study. At the end of each summary, I interpret the results in a way in which I think empirical tax research should contribute to policy discussion.
First essay: Voluntary pension plan savings and tax incentives
Many western countries face increasing difficulties in financing their current social security programs due to the decreasing proportion of the working-age population. In response they have been cutting the future scope of their public pay-as-you-go pension systems. In order to guarantee an adequate level of old-age income, they have tried to encourage individual pension savings by granting tax allowances.
The most common reason for encouraging tax-deferred voluntary pension plans (VPP) is to increase the aggregate savings rate and se-cure the income of retired persons. The paternalistic argument in favor of preferential tax treatment is that savers are myopic and they start to provide for pension savings too late and save too little. Also, the huge heterogeneity in people's saving behavior, with some saving too much and some not enough, could be a reason for governments to allow tax-preferred pension schemes (Banks and Diamond (2010) ).
However, there are counter-arguments too. Only a small part of the increased pension funds are new savings. Most are actually transfers from other savings instruments to tax-preferred instruments (see e.g. Attanasio et al. (2005) , Chung et al. (2008) and Disney et al. (2010) ). In addition, many front-loaded VPP instruments are problematic in countries where certain subpopulations can get larger tax advantages than others. This is especially true if the taxation is progressive.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically how the Finnish tax reform of 2005 affected the behavior of VPP savers in Finland. Before the reform, savings were deducted from labor income and the benefits were taxed as labor income, subject to a steeply progressive tax rate schedule, common for the Nordic type dual income tax systems. The reform changed the tax treatment to a flat-rate capital income taxation regime. The previous tax schedule was seen as being problematic as the individuals faced different saving incentives depending on their taxable income. The most drastic incentive change was among high income earners who were close to retirement age. Among young and middle income individuals the change in the incentives was very moderate, if any. Due to this variation, the reform seems to open up an interesting opportunity to estimate the effects of the tax change on different income groups. In this paper I apply the reform as a natural experiment using a difference-in-difference method. In the analysis, the control group is formulated for middle income individuals, who are compared to high and low income individuals who faced the largest changes in their saving incentives. The main objective is to examine whether or not the coverage and/or the amount of savings in VPPs changed.
According to the results, it seems obvious that the reform of 2005 affected the VPP savings behavior of individuals. High-income individuals who faced a decrease in their tax incentive to save in VPPs reduced their savings. Also the savings coverage among such persons decreased but increased among low-income individuals whose incentive to save in VPPs increased. It seems that all of the responses were solely due to a change in men's behavior. Thus women did not change their behavior at all as a result of the reform.
However, much of the responses could come from individuals' reallocation of savings (Slemrod's second tier) and not from changes in total savings (third tier), as many previous studies have indicated. Un-fortunately, due to the lack of micro data on total savings, this study cannot answer how aggregate savings were affected by the reform. For this reason it is hard to offer a conclusive analysis of the effectiveness of the taxes on savings based on the results of this paper.
Second essay: Income-shifting between tax bases
Behavioral responses to income taxation decrease the efficiency of a tax system. One source of this kind of inefficiency is tax avoidance activity. Income-shifting between differently taxed tax bases is a common example of a tax avoidance channel. Income-shifting is generally recognized in economics literature, but only a few studies have offered credible empirical estimates of the extent of it (Gordon and Slemrod (2000) , Fjaerli and Lund (2001) , Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) , Pirttilä and Selin (2011) ). Income-shifting is a very policy relevant topic, especially among Nordic countries, as it has even named to be the achilles heel of the dual income tax system (Sørensen, (1994) ). There have been various studies and reports studying income-shifting behavior and incentives (see, e.g. Jacob and Alstadsaeter (2013)).
Income-shifting is especially relevant for entrepreneurs and the owners of privately held businesses. Compared to wage earners, entrepreneurs and business owners have greater legal possibilities to engage in income-shifting, as they can more easily apply different types of income as a source of personal compensation. Incomeshifting possibilities created by the tax code are especially pronounced within a so-called Nordic type dual income tax system, in which the effective marginal tax rate schedules for labor income and capital income differ significantly from one another.
The study exploits the extensive corporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland as an exogenous source of tax rate variation. In general, the reform increased the marginal tax rates on dividends by abolishing the single taxation of dividends. Thus the reform increased incentives to pay wages instead of dividends as a form of personal compensation for many owners. Importantly, income-shifting incentives changed differently among the owners based on the net assets position (assets−liabilities) of the firm. For some owners there were only small changes in tax rates, whereas some owners faced large changes in income-shifting incentives. Therefore, the reform enables to apply policy evaluation methods.
This variation combined with the total tax record data and the opportunity to link tax record information from the owner level to the firm level create an interesting starting point to analyze incomeshifting responses. The extensive data allow us to precisely define the tax-optimal composition of total gross income for each owner before and after the reform. Analyzing how changes in the tax-optimal in-come composition affects the changes in the realized income composition provides us credible empirical evidence on the extent and significance of income-shifting behavior.
The owners of privately held corporations seem to be active in income-shifting. Tax-optimal income composition has a clear and robust effect on the realized income composition of business owners. The results suggest that one euro increase (decrease) in tax optimal wage increases (decreases) 66 cents of realized wages. Also, according to the results, it seems that other observable owner-or firm-level characteristics than tax related incentives do not explain the changes in realized wages.
The results imply a welfare loss due to the income-shifting responses. Nevertheless, the welfare effect of income-shifting depends strongly on the marginal resource cost. If it is very small, the welfare loss is also small (see Chetty (2009b) ). The costs are very difficult to approximate as we do not have any direct data for them. Although these costs are not necessarily great, the results suggest that costs have an effect on the estimate of income-shifting. Thus the costs are certainly not negligible. From that perspective income-shifting still creates inefficiencies in the economy and those might be mitigated by simply re-designing and adjusting the tax code and regulations.
However, this study concentrates solely on the income-shifting responses that are related to the second tier of Slemrod's hierarchy. These are not, of course, as relevant as e.g. possible changes in the real activity of business owners due to income-shifting opportunities. Thus in future research it would be interesting to study the effects of income-shifting on the real activity of business owners. These possible positive effects would decrease the inefficiency or might even end up increasing the total efficiency. Therefore, until such time as these results are available, we are not able to give a conclusive estimate of the effects of income-shifting created by the taxes on the total efficiency.
Third essay: Firm-level dividend taxes and MNEs
The role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has increased in the world economy in the last couple of decades. MNEs operate in various countries which offer them possibilities to exploit cross-country differences in tax systems. Therefore it is no surprise that several OECD countries have reformed their corporate tax systems very actively in recent years. A common trend in Europe has been to reduce tax rates on corporate profits. This trend can be explained at least partly by a worry that firms might increasingly move their operations to other countries. MNEs also exploit variations in tax rates across countries, thus lowering the tax bases in high tax rate countries.
Given the importance of MNEs and the difficulties in designing the taxation applying to them, there has been surprisingly little empirical research establishing natural experimental evidence between taxes and the behavior of MNEs (Bond et al. (1996) , Bond et al. (2007) , Hines and Rice (1994) , Clausing (2003) , Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) ).
The third article in my dissertation studies the abolition of equalization tax (EQT) in Finland in 2005. EQT was an important element of imputation credit system aiming to protect domestic tax revenues by ensuring that no dividends can be distributed from profits that are not subject to domestic corporate tax. EQT served this goal by levying an extra corporate-level tax if dividends were financed from taxexempted (or leniently taxed) profits, and MNEs were particularly affected by this tax. The main interest lies in the effects of the abolishment of EQT on dividends, investments and the use of alternative channels to repatriate foreign profits. The reform is used as a natural experiment to examine the behavioral responses of MNEs to taxes. It allows us to evaluate the causal effect of the abolition of EQT on firms which faced a high risk of being liable to pay EQT on distributed dividends (MNEs). Our control group is formulated from other large firms which were not at risk of EQT liability before the reform.
The empirical results suggest that affected firms increased their dividend payments considerably, by approximately 23 per cent. Also, the repatriation of foreign profits in the form of intra-company dividends increased after the repeal of EQT. Furthermore, the results imply an increase in the reported profits of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, suggesting a decrease in profit-shifting. However, there are no changes in the level of real or financial investments. The results emphasize the sensitivity of dividend decisions to taxes both outside and inside an MNE.
Nevertheless, it seems that taxes do not affect the real decisions of MNEs as their investments do not change. The only channels of response seem to be between the financial accounts of firms across countries, the second tier in the Slemrod (1992) article mentioned before. Thus, even though there are clear responses to taxes in the behavior of MNEs, efficiency is not necessarily affected much as real economic responses, in terms of changes in investments, are not detected.
Fourth essay: Consumption taxes and labor-intensive businesses
In many countries the share of consumption taxes of total tax revenues has increased significantly in recent years. In addition, many governments have tried to stimulate certain industries by allowing them to have reduced consumption tax rates. These policy changes have usually been targeted at labor-intensive industries. The main objective was to stimulate employment, but also to reduce the incentive for these businesses to operate in the black economy (CD Directive 1999/85/EC).
Despite the vast theoretical literature (e.g. Ramsey (1927) , Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , Myles (1989) ), currently there is surprisingly little empirical literature concerning the effects of consumption taxes on prices, demand and employment (Carbonnier (2007) , Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) , Kosonen (2010) , Marion and Muehlegger (2011) ). Also, many previous studies focus solely on price responses. However, price responses are not sufficient statistics for efficiency analysis. It is more important to know the demand elasticity.
According to theory, goods with less elastic demand should be taxed more than goods with high elasticity (Ramsey (1927) ). Therefore it is important to study to what extent consumption tax affects consumer prices and demand. This paper tests these impacts with an analysis of the effect of a cut in the value added tax (VAT) rate on restaurants in Finland when the VAT rate was cut from 23% to 13% from July 2010. Also, the paper analyzes the effects of the reform on employment as the main objective was to stimulate job creation. Swedish government also made a similar VAT cut for restaurant industry from the beginning of 2012.
Again, the difference-in-differences (DD) approach is applied. Restaurant meals in Finland in the treatment group are compared against multiple control groups. The control groups are hotel services in Finland, and restaurant meals in Estonia, Norway and Sweden. In the demand and wage sum estimations we use only hotels in Finland as a comparison group due to data limitations. In the future research the Swedish restaurants are also compared to Finnish restaurants when the demand and wage sum estimations.
The results show that the VAT cut reduced restaurant meal prices by approximately 2% for a representative restaurant in Finland. The implied full pass-through would have been a 7.4% decrease in consumer prices. Thus the reduction we found was a fourth of the full pass-through. The consumer-weighted price response is higher, over half of the full pass-through, implying that larger restaurants reduced their prices more than smaller establishments. There is substantial heterogeneity in the price responses by firm-level characteristics. Restaurants that are part of a chain lowered their prices more often than those not belonging to a chain. The results suggest that there was no quantitative increase in demand for restaurant meals and that employment did not increase as a result of the VAT reduction. Also, there was no change in the number of exits from the industry or new businesses established in the industry due to the reform.
The results imply that the VAT reduction for restaurants did not manage to accomplish its main objective, which was to increase employment in the industry, the third tier in Slemrod's hierarchy. Also, the reform reduced prices only a little and the consumption of restaurant meals did not change. This leads to the conclusion that the amount of restaurant meals sold is rather inelastic with respect to the prices and that the VAT reduction for restaurants was not very efficient.
Conclusions
The aim of this article is to present the recent developments in empirical economics. The new wave of empirical methods has increased the credibility of empirical research considerably. Also, in the field of public economics and tax research, new evidence of the effects of taxes on different outcomes has emerged with these methods. The applicability of policy evaluation methods is extensive and more innovative research questions have been applied in the field. At the same time the theoretical literature has also improved and offers clearer hypotheses for empirical research.
For future research it would be desirable for this development continued. Also, experimental research designs could and should be used even more to produce high-quality research. There is substantial potential for more good research from Nordic countries because of the good register data sets, for example, applying tax policy changes as an exogenous variation.
However, all tax reforms or policy changes are not applicable for an exogenous variation and thus, for policy evaluation studies. The necessary condition for the use of policy evaluation methods is that there needs to be a credible way to compare those who were affected by the reform to those who were not. This condition would be easier to fulfill by, for example, organizing regional or random experiments that are planned together with policy makers or administrative institutions and researchers. Especially desirable for Nordic tax research is that it would take advantage of using random experiments as a source of variation and applying outcomes from high quality micro data sets. This could be used to find out how effective a certain policy would be and then lead to more efficient policies in the future.
